

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistance Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MACJ261

15 December 1967

SUBJECT: TRANSLATION REPORT

25X1A

LOG No. 12-1384-67

1. Attached is a full English translation of a captured enemy document.

4 copies

## 2. Capture Data:

a. Title: Ho Chi Minh's Order for Implementation of General Counter Offensive and General Uprising during 1967 Winter and 1968 Spring and Summer.

b. Date: 19 Nov 67

c. Location: AT987227

d. Unit: B/2/327, 1/101st US Abn Div

e. Synopsis: Personal notebook, entries dated from 5 Nov 67 through 12 Nov 67, maintained by Va Sinh Vihn, contains notes taken from news bulletins and Party activities of his unit. Document states that the Central Headquarters /Prob NVN Politburo/ met recently to further analyze the 13th Resolution and concluded that the time for a direct revolution has come and that the opportunity for a general counter offensive and general uprising is within reach. "Therefore", the Central Party Committee and Uncle /Ho Chi Minh/ have ordered the /Lao Dong/ Party committee, in South Vietnam and the entire army and population of South Vietnam to implement a general counter offensive and general uprising. Document states, "tell our brothers not to say that this order comes from the Party and Uncle /Ho Chi Minh/ but to say that it comes from the Liberation Front".

3. Date document received at Central Document Exploitation Center (CDEC): 6 Dec 67

4. In the event the attached translation report is declassified, the "CONFIDENTIAL" marking and this cover letter will be removed.

*Stephen Smygelaki*  
for  
A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

CONFIDENTIAL IS A US CLASSIFICATION  
EQUIVALENT TO VIETNAMESE KIN AND WILL  
BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY.

THIS DOCUMENT IS RELEASABLE TO  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND FREE  
WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES.

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OSD, ARMY Declassification/Release Instructions on File

#12-1334-67

**CONFIDENTIAL**/Page 1 of original text/

8 November 1967

Current News

Achievements gained during July, August and September 1967. According to incomplete reports during these three months, our army and people killed 3,200 enemy troops including 3,200 American and 3,000 satellite troops. The list of enemy units destroyed showed 10 battalions and units of equivalent size including 4 Infantry d Battalions and 2 US Armored units of E Squadron size with 40 tanks and 88 companies (including 17 US companies and 1 satellite company), 5 artillery Cs Batteries, 179 platoons (including 16 US, 1 satellite and 3 artillery plats). Our army and people downed 747 aircraft, destroyed 1180 Mil vehicles including 790 armored cars and 133 artillery pieces and sank 76 river craft. We derailed 8 locomotives and 20 cars, mounted attacks in series against military sub-sectors and province capitals, destroyed 94 posts, 71 watch towers, 78 bridges, 67 culverts, burned 52 ammunition depots and 19 gasoline dumps (The total quantity of gasoline destroyed was 14 million liters). A comparison with the achievements gained during July, August and September 1966, showed that the enemy losses in personnel and the number of aircraft downed during July, August and September 1967 have doubled. The number of armored platoons destroyed has tripled. The number of mechanized vehicles and boats destroyed has more than doubled. The number of armored cars destroyed has tripled. More enemy units were destroyed during three months of 1967 than during three months of 1966.

News on the shelling of the Independence Palace.

According to the UPI Report, on the night of 31 October 1967, the Saigon Liberation troops shelled the Independence Palace during the President's inaugural ball. The first shell exploded near the Palace while the guests were walking around the Palace holding their glass of liquor. The guests were panic-stricken and ran away. The police started searching crowded places. They had to light the area with flares. The ball was delayed for one hour. General Westmoreland was frightened. Some reporters rushed out of the Palace and saw an Australian officer's car with a damaged hood as a result of the shelling. An AP reporter said that the Liberation troops can fire into the Capitol anytime they wish.

28 and 29 October 1967

The Liberation troops strongly attacked Loc Ninh, Thu Dau Mot town and completely destroyed the defensive force of 4 companies, 4 platoons, and 1 pacification team. They downed 6 aircraft, destroyed 2 weapons and ammunition depots and seized hundreds of weapons and military equipment. The Liberation troops controlled the town throughout the night of the 28th and all day the 29th. They actively helped the residents of strategic hamlets and organized a victory ceremony.

/Page 2 of original text/

Late in the afternoon of 29 October, the US dispatched a task force to rescue the town. The Liberation troops ambushed and destroyed this task force composed of one US battalion, 1 US artillery d battalion, 1 US armored d battalion, 1 element of 42/53/75 2d battalion, 9th Regiment, 5th Division/ and puppet special forces units trained by the US.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#12-1384-67

On 29 October 1967, at 0200 hours the liberation troops of Cholon attacked Loc Giang, completely destroyed 2 enemy C [companies] and 8 armored cars, killed and wounded more than 100 men of the 34th Ranger battalion [RVNAF].

7 November 1967:

Report on the Party Committee Resolution concerning the establishment of the "4 excellences" Party Chapters.

I. Characteristics

The motivation for the establishment of "4 excellences" Party Chapters after the establishment of "3 excellences" Party Chapters constituted a favorable condition.

Conduct motivation along this line after the Summer activity phase and after political re-orientation for cadre and soldiers.

Difficulties:

The shortage of troops and dispersion of units created many difficulties.

The improvement of knowledge of Party Chapters and Party members was very slow. They failed to realize the urgency in the motivation for the establishment of Party Chapters. This certainly affected the motivation activities.

II. Motivation for the establishment of "4 excellences" Party Chapters.

Party Committees and agencies failed to properly guide units in the motivation for the establishment of "4 excellences" Party Chapters.

[Page 3 of original text]

III. Estimation of results

1. The Party Chapters thoroughly assimilated the Party policy and line and helped the Party members strengthen their sense of responsibility. From this starting point, the Party members acquired firm determination and demonstrated marked improvement. The secretaries and Party Chapter members performed their leadership roles. Their working procedures were carefully studied and practiced and the Party Chapters and units made good progress.

2. The political re-organization phase was effective. It served to consolidate the consciousness of the Party members, especially the key Party members who proved determined to endure hardships and were capable leaders of the people.

3. The Party Chapters placed greater emphasis on leadership in political and ideological matters. They helped the units overcome difficulties and perform their combat activities effectively.

4. The Party Chapters conducted a successful struggle against rightism, passiveness and individualism. The units also scored good results in this respect.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#12-1384-67

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Estimation of strong and weak points.

Strong points: The E/Regt/ Party Committee and Party Committees of various levels provided effective leadership and took opportune advantage of experiences.

The secretaries were particularly improved on the policy, procedures, purposes and requirements of the 4 good Party Chapters.

Improvement of working procedures and qualifications was given due attention.

The agencies were improved in time by their respective Party chapters.

Weak points, such as irregularity in activity and routine, slow development of Party members, were discovered in time and remedied.

[Page 4 of original text]

Weak points: The Party members were not made to assimilate the resolution of Công Trường /Regt/. They were still confused by difficulties. This affected the leadership of the Party chapters.

Learning from experiences was not yet considered important. Leadership was still poor.

The agencies did not discover their deficiencies in time or remedied them only superficially. This created confusion for the lower levels.

The D /Bn/ Party Committee and inter Party Chapters still had shortcomings in their leadership. They still relied on higher echelons in some fields.

The classification of Party members was not entirely accurate.

The measures and procedures were not regularly adopted. The group chapters were not effective in their considerations. Improvement was not given due attention.

Party development in some party chapters was simplified and a number of new Party members did not have any influence over the people.

V. Resolution of the Party Committee

Between now and the end of December 1967, two thirds of the 4 good Party Chapters must be attained.

Party development must be characterized by a 30% increase.

There must be a Party cell in every platoon and Party members in every Group.

There must be good progress in routine activity.

In particular, secretaries of Party Committees must improve.

Documents must be used for regular indoctrination of Party members.

Develop Party members who have greater qualifications.

Requirements: Continue to assimilate the urgent purpose and the need for the establishment of 4 good Party chapters. Make each Party member realize the importance and requirements of tasks and place him in the right position to accomplish it.

The Party chapter members must start from this point to consolidate and strengthen their viewpoints, making "Iron Fortresses" of the Party Chapters.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

# 12-1384-67

[Page 5 of original text]

- Various Party Committee-level cadre must use guidelines and principles, and adopt concrete measures for implementation.
- Draw good and bad points from past experiences, be aware of the necessity for close relationship between Party Chapters and underground agents to work out an appropriate and well founded plan of action.
- Always seek to improve the working conditions of the Party and people, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Constantly improve combat efficiency, leadership and education. Always strive to meet the four-good-quality criteria in advancing the movement.
- Secretaries must always conduct inspections and encourage Party Chapters in their work so that at recapitulation-of-results time, all Party Chapters will have attained the 4 good-quality standard.
- Party Chapters must exercise their leadership role in the formation of penetration-attack teams.

Impending problems to be solved and  
and correction of shortcomings

1. Party Chapters have not yet fully caught the spirit of the motto and political principles of the Party. They have not given due and continuous attention to conducting indoctrination sessions on the nature and good traditions of the armed forces or considered political background as the nucleus of all activities. This resulted in a deviation from the fundamental principles [of the Party] on the part of certain areas. In the field of political leadership, no proper attention was paid to class-struggle education and the "classless" [proletarian] positions were not consolidated. At times, and in certain areas, non-classless ideological symptoms were manifest. All this contributed to limiting our successes in time of difficulties. Long-standing shortcomings were not replaced such as [non-replaced] lost weapons, dead soldiers left behind on the battle field, infractions of discipline, loose talk, laziness, defection and AWOL's, malevolent ideas---[sic].

2. The education and training of Party Committee [members] was not conducted on a regular and continuous basis. Party members have not made steady [ideological] progress. Party members' leadership role was still restricted. In fact, in recent times, there were some Party members who fought very gallantly and intrepidly in previous battles but who became faint-hearted and did not fight well in subsequent engagements. Party Chapters's activities were off and on and sub-standard, qualitatively and quantitatively. The task of developing the Party was performed superficially.

3. Leadership over units was not all-encompassing. The activation of [new]

[Page 6 of original text]

units progressed slowly and did not meet prescribed requirements.

4

CONFIDENTIAL

# 12-1384-67

CONFIDENTIAL

Administrative management of units, personnel, installations and properly was poor.

4. Relations with the masses were substandard. Occasionally, in certain areas, cadre and Party members went so far as to commit serious blunders. The living conditions of the armed forces were not given proper consideration. They attributed this weaknesses to having to live in jungled and mountainous areas without enough food to eat and medicine to cure their diseases. They did not place full confidence in the people nor did they indoctrinate them politically. Almost all these shortcomings were imputed to the soldiers [privates] and attributed to a lack of intimate relations with the local population. The local people were not given any assistance, on the contrary, they [cadre] adopted a condescending and arrogant attitude toward the people. The cadre used strong words which had a bad consequence on internal unity and on the unity of mind and heart within units and agencies.

Future guidelines of B4 Party  
Chapter

1. Political and ideological field = Indoctrination sessions must be conducted to thoroughly instill the strategic guidelines and the struggle motto of the Party [into individuals concerned]. We must adopt a clear-cut ideological stand and strengthen our faith in the inevitable victory of the Revolution. With such faith, we must be ready to sacrifice ourselves to achieve the goals of the Revolution, of the Party, and of the fatherland. This concept must be crystallized into concrete actions, as our "Chairman" [Hô Chi Minh] says, "Party Chapters and Party members; exemplary actions are an unspoken order."

In concrete terms = In coming attacks, Party members and local people must be one hundred percent sound ideologically. No one shall run away from the battle field / without putting up a fight/. There will be no more cases of desertion and defection. Measures must be taken to secure large victories during our attacks.

B- Discipline problems must be solved, especially regarding Party members and cadre.

[Page 7 of original text]

At the same time, leadership should be attentive to the implementation of the Party's regulations, primarily operational regulations concerning the people, our cadre, and Party members.

Security maintenance must be absolutely ensured. Reading the enemy's magazines and listening to their broadcasts are prohibited. Attention must be placed on the preservation of documents, the Party, and armed forces. Fortifications must be constructed four hours after arriving at a place and leaders must ensure hot meals for troops after 1 day.

The Party's policies must be strictly implemented. The violation of regulations, primarily regulation concerning civilian proselyting and the treatment of dead and wounded soldiers must be checked. Cadre, especially Party Chapter members and Party members, must properly fulfill this guideline.

# 12-1384-67

CONFIDENTIAL

Weapons must be properly taken care of so that they will be serviceable at all times. The loss of weapons by Party Chapter members and Party members must be reduced to a minimum.

Considering logistics, it must be ensured that every individual can have at least 1.5 liters [of rice] and sufficient vegetable soup. Food allowance must be adequately provided. Comprehensive reports of the unit's expenses must be drafted.

The task of leading and organizing the people's

Prime consideration must be devoted to improving the Group Chapter Command Staff so that it can develop the unit and steadily preserve the Group Chapter.

The leadership of the military council consists of electing enough members to implement democratic principles in the unit.

The Party's tasks:

Backward Party members must be regularly given reorientation and the Party activities must be unremittently carry out. Every week, there must be a meeting of Party cells. Every 2 months, there must be a meeting of chapter [Party] committees. The development of the Party is also essential. Its quality and quantity must be constantly ensured. Specifically, starting now, members must be motivated, but primarily, from now until 3 February (during the period of Party member recruitment), new members must be recruited.

To fulfill the above criteria, various Party cells should classify the people and constantly improve them in quality and quantity, regardless of their Party status (new or old Party members), and the area they come from (North or South VN).

[Page 8 of original text]

Leadership must concern itself with tactical training and strive to make troops, after only a few days training, clearly understand combat techniques. They must be able to participate in continuous fighting. Cadre should study and know more than is required so that they can successfully perform missions assigned by higher echelons.

In conclusion, the above information is designed to solve all problems of the immediate and long range tasks and to settle the present revolutionary situation. It is mandatory that we place great emphasis on the ideological and political problems and motivate the people's vigilance in order to better the unit's situation and pave the way for our successful accomplishment of missions in the coming Winter-Spring phase.

Decisions and guidelines for future activities set up by the Party Chapter.

CONFIDENTIAL

12-1384-67

CONFIDENTIAL

[Page 9 of original text]

10 November 1967

Assessment and evaluation of Past Security activities of the Unit .

+ Enemy Situation: During the past year, the enemy used espionage and political warfare for attacking our Revolutionary forces, especially our main force.

They stole documents from us and destroyed our arms caches. To addition, they used counterfeit papers to penetrate our controlled areas for investigation.

Enemy activities were conducted under many forms; namely; espionage, trade, temptation, and Sub-Sector intelligence.

+ Friendly situation: Strong points: The Chapter Party Committee, the Party Chapter and the commander have attacked importance to political training and instructed the soldiers on the maintenance of security. Consequently, the unit has obtained successes in the task and strictly complied with all regulations concerning the drying of clothes, cooking and maintenance of security.

On the basis of political ideology, every soldier was conscious of his responsibilities in defending the Party.

Weak points: Training was not provided frequently and continuously. As a result, the soldiers still committed errors in taking precautions against the enemy.

Due to carelessness and underestimation of the enemy, 2 Comrades of the political section, as well as comrades Dê and Đông, have lost their weapons etc [sic].

Administration of troops. We failed to carefully investigate the soldiers thoughts and positively provide training for various operational elements.

Comrade Lô and some others were still talkative; consequently, they failed to maintain security. Worse still, all internal affairs, positions and responsibilities of military as well as political cadre, especially of Hoài Nhôn and Đức Phổ districts were revealed to the people.

In operations and when bivouacking, the soldiers failed to strictly observe discipline. They still chopped sticks, moved from place to place, and dried clothes haphazardly.

[Page 10 of original text]

The most important factor is that our men like to read the enemy leaflets, newspaper and magazines, and to listen to the enemy radio broadcasts. Someone even stored these documents. Desertion and defection are frequent. Some betrayed us and surrendered to the enemy etc... [sic]. Others demonstrated dishonesty in stealing the people's property. This has lessened the troops' prestige among the people and the people have lost their confidence in the troops.

- For this reason, to properly execute the campaign of countering spies and maintaining security for the protection of the Party and the troops, we should study the following lessons:

CONFIDENTIAL



12-1284-67

CONFIDENTIAL

Lesson I.

Aims and Requirements:

For cadre: Thoroughly understand the enemy's plot and tactics in their Chiêu Hồi / Open Arms policy. Be fully aware of their furtive, cunning, and secret activities in all fields. They undermine our ideology and disrupt our ranks. At the same time, we must realize that, due to a very high determination, the enemy has successfully inflicted damage on our forces. However, the main reason for this damage has been our failure to take precautions against the enemy. We still committed many serious mistakes. Consequently, we must make a major effort to correct these weak points.

+ For soldiers: thoroughly understand some main points concerning the enemy's plot and tactics. Pay attention to spies who operate within the perimeter of the local area where we are located.

Realize that, although the enemy is striving to destroy us, the decisive factor will be our lack of awareness and our negligence in the execution of internal regulations.

[Page 11 of original text]

Some people lack a firm ideological stand. Their revolutionary character is not strong. This is the reason why they perpetrated the mistakes which are the objectives of the enemy attack. Realizing these enemy plots and tactics. We should heighten our determination to fight the enemy. Regularly counter the enemy. Heighten our revolutionary character. Provide a sense of endurance and patience. Provide a sense of discipline. Counter the tendency to balk at hardships and difficulties. Avoid simplicity, liberalism and talkativeness. Counter boasting which brings about disclosure of official secrets.

Special requirements: [Blank in OT]

12 November 1967.

Dissemination of the Order for the General Offensive and the General Uprising.

- Recently, the Central Headquarters [Prob NVN Politburo] held a meeting to analyze the 13th Resolution. They unanimously realized that the dry season situation had changed from that of an unconventional war to that of a limited war. The US intention is to concentrate all their potential to end the war in South Vietnam. They increased their troop strength from 130 thousand to 200 thousand and then 430 thousand. At present, their troop strength is 460 thousand, which added to the puppet troops, make a total of 1 million 200 thousand troops. The main scheme of the enemy is to use their two-pronged attack that is to carry out their pacification program and to conduct search and destroy operations. This has been done in vain. Not only have they not been able to obtain good results, but they have also suffered a loss of 180,000 troops. North Vietnam: NVN has continuously defeated the US's escalated war. The Central Headquarters concludes that the enemy has failed in achieving their strategic goals. The pacification plan should attain 17,000 [sic] but only 5% of this goal was achieved. Intensive activities have been noted in Bình Định, Phú Yên and Gia Lai provinces. 80% of Phú Yên province is liberated.

8

CONFIDENTIAL

#12-1384-67

CONFIDENTIAL

Previously, they [the enemy] spent 3 billion dollars a month on the war. Now the cost rises to 90 billion dollars a month. So, the cost has increased 3 times, if compared with the Korean war.

+ Consequently, serious contradictions arise. The French told the Americans: "We were defeated by the Communist after 10 years [of fighting]. Now you are defeated by the Communist after 20 years. You are more stupid than we were."

[Page 12 of original text]

- The war in Vietnam has motivated American Negroes to initiate a fierce struggle movement.

Leaders of political parties and heads of Government are very confused and puzzled. At present, a movement is being initiated to collect about 5,000 signatures to demand that [President] Johnson end the war. [President] Johnson is very confused and puzzled at present.

McNamara demands that the President stop the bombing of North Vietnam. They [the US] conclude that the bombings are totally fruitless. On the contrary, the bombings only harden the [attitude of the] Government of NVN.

Even McNamara complains that the Vietnamese war has rendered the American people miserable and wretched. It brings advantages only to the Imperialists selling oil, gasoline, bombs, and ammunition.

- Review of the [US] forces in Europe [sic]: 5 divisions are in Korea; 2 divisions are in the USA for home defense; 6 divisions have been sent to Vietnam. They have employed 6 divisions and 3 brigades [in Vietnam], but can do nothing. They are still encountering failures.

+ Remarks on the puppet Government: Although they [GVN] have tried to establish a President and a Vice-President, contradictions between the civilian and the military are still serious, in spite of US reconciliatory efforts to prevent a Coup d'etat. But the situation worsens because they [Military and civilian factions within the government] are trying to initiate an internal purge. The Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Binh Dinh Province, was imprisoned. This case is being vehemently criticized by the people.

- [General Maxwell] Taylor said, sighing: "We have selected the wrong objectives. We are seriously mistaken!"

[Page 13 of original text]

The world-wide war no longer exists. "He says that he has no strength to wage large scale attacks; the more he sends his troops [to SVN] the more he suffers losses; a protracted war is not advantageous. He is afraid of [Red] China if he attacks NVN. He adds, "Should we [protract or shorten the war; should it be] peace or negotiations?" He states that, "we loose the war while we still have over 1 million troops. This is similar to swallowing a bitter thing and saying it is sweet candy." (When Speaking of illusion of Peace [we should] strengthen our will to fight).

Friendly situation: The following remarks are noted: We win great and continuous victories. We are in an offensive position and are launching continuous attacks against the enemy. The Situation in Gia Lai promises many favorable developments this year. In Phu Yen, the recent difficulties are gone and 80% of the local population has been liberated. Our main forces now operate in the low-lands. The enemy is on the defensive. He has abandoned 70 strong points in

CONFIDENTIAL

#12-1384-67

CONFIDENTIAL

Quảng Nam and 10 in Bình Định. Only about 2 Special Forces C's [companies] are left to protect the defensive positions. The political movement becomes stronger in all areas and is ready [possibly] for uprising. Many successes have been obtained by the coordination of political and military activities conducted in Towns and Cities, such as in Lộc Ninh and Bèn Tré. In Saigon, we have controlled many streets.

The Central Headquarters concludes that the direct revolution has come and that the opportunity for a general offensive and general uprising is within reach.

The Central Headquarters of the [Lao Động] Party and Uncle [Hồ Chí Minh] have ordered the [Lao Động] Party Committee in SVN and the entire Army and people of SVN to implement a general offensive and general uprising in order to achieve a decisive victory for the Revolution within the [1967] Winter and 1968 Spring and Summer.

The Region 5 [Party] Committee and Military Affairs [Party] Committee of Military Region 5 have promised the [Lao Động] Party that Region 5 will be completely liberated during the 1967-1968 Winter - Spring Campaign.

Action to be taken: Use very strong Military attacks in coordination with the uprisings of the local population to take over towns and cities. Troops should flood the lowlands. They should move toward liberating the Capital City [Saigon], take power and try to rally enemy brigades and regiments to our side one by one. Via leaflets, propaganda should be broadly distributed among the people as well as to the enemy Officers and enlisted personnel. The above subject should be fully understood by Cadre and troops; however, our brothers should not say that this order comes from the Party and Uncle [Hồ Chí Minh], but to say it comes from the [Liberation] Front. Also, do not specify times for implementation.

Emulation: From 1 December on, all units should take the initiative to organize emulation. Talk should refer to the victory of X 300 [sic] and stress the following subjects:

Situation of the Unit before it carries out the missions.

- Significance and purpose of the mission.
- How to build up high determination through democratic discussion.
- Action to settle difficulties, especially to strengthen the ideology in the course of the implementation of the mission.
- Bravery and morale of cadre and troops during combat.
- Spirit of enduring hardships and overcoming difficulties.

The talk should end with the following useful conclusions:

- Unshakable resolution of the unit.
- Unconditional execution of orders.
- High determination to attack the enemy.
- High sense of security maintenance.
- High sense of solidarity and unity of mind among cadre and troops.
- High spirit of enduring hardships and overcoming difficulties.
- Correct attitude of Party Chapter as well as resourcefulness and prompt action of unit members.
- Good implementation of the political task and mission entrusted by the Party.

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----

CONFIDENTIAL